In the classical liberal state, the Armed Forces had the function of guaranteeing national sovereignty, protecting its borders and leading possible wars against other countries. Political representation was reserved for the parties.

But, over time, the Armed Forces have become a reserve political agent for the ruling classes. The case of the coup d'état in Brazil in 1964 became typical, in the framework of the Cold War and the National Security Doctrine, assumed by the Armed Forces, through the War College, since its foundation in the late 1940s. As the peoples’ forces ascended, throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the right wing's ability to act through its traditional parties weakened – especially after the failure of the Jânio Quadros government –, so the Armed Forces were asked to intervene, breaking with democratic process and establishing a military dictatorship that was to last more than two decades.

After this regime ran out of steam, the democratic transition process in Brazil did not represent an open political defeat for the Armed Forces in our country, unlike what happened in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. The Armed Forces have had to withdraw from the militarization of the State with which they had played a leading role in Brazilian political history. But they have never assimilated the democratization of the country, they have tolerated it, powerless to prevent it, and, above all, they have never undertaken self-criticism of all they did during the dictatorship.

It was not by chance that the Truth Commission represented a hard blow to the institution's image. In the democratic transition, the Armed Forces had managed to impose their amnesty, which included the crime of torture, that has no time-limit for prosecution.

The negotiated nature of the transition, reflected in the defeat of the campaign for direct elections for president of Brazil and in the central role of the Electoral College, which produced the fusion of the old and the new, with the election of the binomial Tancredo-Sarney, preserved the amnesty imposed by the Armed Forces.

The Truth Commission became unacceptable to the Armed Forces, because it opened wide the eyes of society to the systematic repression put in place by the dictatorship, including torture as a repeated method of action by the military.

The witnesses of its victims revealed to society, with names and faces, the monstrosities committed by the Armed Forces. Several high-ranking officials revealed their discomfort, never being able to counter the unquestionable allegations. The political and legal persecutions launched by the right wing to try to evict the PT (Workers’ Party) from government, after exhausting all attempts to do so democratically, with the repeated electoral defeats of the Toucans, were accompanied by statements with threatening tones by officials of the Armed Forces.

Shortly before the habeas corpus trial of Lula by the Supreme Federal Tribunal, the head of the Army made a threatening statement, which took effect in the negative decision of the Judiciary. He later justified that statement, claiming that without it "the process would have gotten out of control.” He was referring, of course, to Lula's freedom and to his role in controlling the political process to the limits he saw fit.

The Temer government, established by the 2016 coup d'état, immediately returned to right-wing fundamentals, the neoliberal model, and he governed with the traditional right-wing parties. The Bolsonaro government intended to present an image of independence from these parties. Initially, his government was based on three axes: ultraliberal economic policy (which guarantees, up to now, the support of big business), the police state of [Justice Minister Sergio] Moro (which intended to transform Lava Jato – the ‘Car Wash’ anticorruption operation – into state policy, a project that today is weakened) and members of the Armed Forces. The latter were indispensable because Bolsonaro did not have a solid party, unlike Temer, though his party has been dismantled over time. Later, the military took on a large number of government positions, including at the Palacio do Planalto [presidential palace]. They took on these mandates with the traits of a corporation, not just any corporation, but one that concentrates the use of military force and that represents the values of order and hierarchy. Their discourse has always continued to guarantee the struggle against "subversion," identified in social movements and left-wing parties.

This military personnel, from Armed Forces that were demoralized as a result of the democratization of the country, of the success of leftist governments and of the revelations of the Truth Commission, are increasingly identified with a government elected thanks to the judicialization of politics and the manipulation of the electoral process. Without ideology or a political project, apart from the control of the political process in the hands of the oligarchy, they did not hesitate to join the government, individually. As the president became weaker, due to his innate inability to join forces, prioritize and govern, the option arose in the right to substitute the president by the vice president; Bolsonaro then decided to give a show of strength, that he is the head of the government, and dismissed several military figures. Those who remained were weakened.

But as the government lost the support of many of its promoters and its popular support, as the wear and tear intensified of the president's actions and those of his sons, involved in corruption and other crimes, the president decided to resume the process of militarization of the government.

The neoliberal model has lost its hegemonic capacity, it is incapable of obtaining a social support base to give it stability, as shown by the accelerated erosion of the Macri government in Argentina. It governs according to the interests of financial capital. A policy that promotes financial speculation, without favoring either production or job creation. It is a policy that systematically reproduces social exclusion, and therefore requires repression, policies of domination, since it does not have the capacity to persuade and to conquer the bases of popular support in a stable manner.

The Armed Forces are a guarantee of resistance against the return of the PT to government, against the protagonist role of social movements. They represent a reserve of cadres for a government that has no party and as a reserve for repression. But the army is not made to govern, in the sense of convincing, dialoguing, living with differences, discussing ideas. They are made to command (since military colleges must train young people for war, unlike other schools, which serve to train young people for freedom, democracy, living with diversity, learning with knowledge). They will have difficulties in dialoguing with Congress, facing criticism, living with popular mobilizations.

They may represent a greater dose of pragmatism in government, replacing or silencing talkative, incompetent and mediocre ministers, seeking greater effectiveness, perhaps even that of the ministries of economy, education and foreign affairs. But they will have to live with the president's intransigent behavior and the actions of his son's militias. They face a tough political test. This may be the last card from that government. That needs militarization, but loses even more its capacity for political leadership. No one can extract water from a stone and, by sitting on the bayonets, he also risks falling victim to them.

(Traducción ALAI)

- Emir Sader, a Brazilian sociologist and political scientist, is coordinator of the Public Policy Laboratory at the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ).