If we had to find a positive element in the exercise of a low-intensity democracy in the May 25^th European elections, and if we got up one morning afflicted with a strange optimism that was not justified by the present conjuncture, we would point out that one of the most interesting questions involved in these elections is the intensification of the debate, inside the left, with respect to the analysis and alternative proposals for the project of European hegemony.

 

With this affirmation we must underline the fact that that debate itself is much more significant than the result of electoral formalities in a profoundly illegitimate and undemocratic European Union, since these debates can, in the medium term, generate some political agenda and interconnections that could overturn the present situation.

 

In this way, for good or evil, more or less timidly, the last few months have moved the political left – whether in parties or movements – to define their diagnosis of the present crisis and the role that European institutions are playing in it, as well as reveal their basic proposals, especially in the strategic area of the economy.

 

 

From the economic perspective, there are several areas of common ground for the left: in the first place, they underline the fact that the European political project does not have, as a founding principle, the reduction of the wide asymmetries among countries or the establishment of a European framework for welfare that reinforces human rights. On the contrary, the genesis of the project is found in the regional implementation of a capitalist logic on the basis of a single market without political unity, with a pivotal role accorded to the expansive strategy of the German economy. Hence, this is in fact the strategic objective of the project that, beyond the usual rhetoric, permeates the set of actions and initiatives tied to the building of the European project.

 

In the second place, the left tends to agree that the economic architecture derived from this specific project, that began to take form with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, is an integral part of the logic of capitalist expansion. This is then at the service of the markets and those who control them, if necessary challenging the large social majorities (as is happening right now in a phase of the intensification of the class struggle). This economic architecture is fundamentally made up of four elements: a single currency that rests on enormous asymmetries between countries, regions and people; an autonomous (with respect to governments, but obviously not to capital) European Central Bank (ECB), that is technocratic and strictly dedicated to limiting inflation and to stabilizing the financial market, but not to increasing the reproduction of the lives of citizens; draconian limits on the public deficit (maximum 3% of the GDP) and the emission of public debt (maximum 60% of GNP) based on the Pact of Stability and Growth (2005); and a profoundly anti-democratic economic direction led by an elite of political representatives, multilateral bodies and transnational companies at the indisputable service of capital reproduction and mercantile profits. In spite of this, and conscious of the relevance of this economic architecture in the European project, we shall see by the following that the present dissent is about how, when, and from where a can strategy be developed to overcome this architecture.

 

Finally, continuing with the existing consensus, the left is together, in the third place, in maintaining that the economic policy applied by European institutions (austerity and limitation of rights; wasteful aid to banks; lack of control vis-à-vis commercial surpluses and the financial bubbles generated by these; pro-market and pro-transnational policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy), which not only fail to contribute positively to overcoming the crisis, but which actually deepen it, increasing the levels of poverty and systemic vulnerability so as to maintain the unstoppable and suicidal capital and profit flows already noted. 

 

It is precisely because of these three common elements that the left agrees that beyond changes in economic policy and the architecture of the economy, it is necessary to redefine the European project on new democratic and emancipatory bases. This would involve the creation of established and enforceable individual, collective and national rights, along with an analysis of how this situation came about and who were responsible. There is sufficient agreement for the demand for a European constituent process (although there are different positions with respect to the territorial implications of this process), and the proposal for a social audit of the debt, indicating which elements of it are illegal and illegitimate, and hence should not be paid.

 

Naturally both proposals should no doubt from part of the agendas of the European left-wing, along with the claim for the enforcement, binding nature and universality of a series of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, capable of confronting existing asymmetries, not only among countries, but also between genders, races and classes. It is, then, imperative for parties and movements to assume as a reference point and engage in a common struggle around these strategic elements that go to the root of the problem.

 

 

Nevertheless, and in spite of certain shared items of consensus, it must be asked if these are enough, given the present conjuncture, to erect a combative and realistic political agenda, one that would impact directly on the command structures of capitalist European Union, and that would allow for emancipatory measures in the middle term. It is here that we find the first items of dissent, since even though the pertinence of a constituent process and an integral accounting of the debt is shared, it is also clear that there are people on the left who think that conditions for such measures on a continental scale are not viable, at least in the medium term. In this way, and in the face of the limited dynamism and projection of these initiatives, we may find ourselves bogged down in an interesting but unreal proposal, even as the basic structure of the hegemonic project (the economic architecture) sits on its heels without serious damage.

 

In this way it becomes clear that to situate the political agenda only in a return to the genesis of the European project is based on two conditions, that are not fulfilled now nor will they be in the future: the first, that there exists or could exist a positive continental power balance for the left; the second, that there be a clear will on the part of the left forces to organize around these initiatives, in the context of a real bid for greater European political unity. Sadly, the power balance in Europe is not only not positive, but is in fact negative for those on the left, with a solid hegemony on the right (conservative, liberal and liberal-social), and with a notable advance of the extreme right (at another time, and from a self-critical perspective, this will have to be looked at from the left). On the other hand, it does not appear that the left are making any serious effort at a real coordination around a constituent process. It is notorious that the weight of domestic political action is much stronger than the continental vision, which is actually somewhat worn down by the anguish generated by the present crisis. There is in fact no agreement on areas of such importance as the socio-economic model to be built, or on national rights and the exercise of the right to self-determination, to think that this option is viable at the present time.

 

In this way, these continental initiatives could become a hopeless effort in practice when we undertake an analysis of the political power balance and the priorities of the left. Meanwhile the real European project – capitalist and neoliberal – continues to castigate the great majorities, who are unable to count on concrete and viable alternatives.

 

In this sense, there are a number of relevant questions to be raised today. Is it necessary to await the beginnings of continental efforts in order to take measures that affect the relation of different countries with the European Union or the Eurozone? Does a country that reaches a positive power balance for the left need to submit to the economic architecture and wait for a hypothetical continental process in order to take charge of their own economic strategy? What position should be maintained on the left if countries such as Catalonia, Scotland or Euskal Herria achieve independence and have to establish their relation with the European Union or the Eurozone? 

 

These are questions that demand a response, and that can be resumed in the following question: What position should the left maintain in the face of the economic architecture generated around the euro? We recall that this architecture (Maastricht, BCE, Troika and Euro) plays an essential role in the whole European structure and presupposes, on the one hand, the structural expression of the foundational project, and on the other, the basis that makes the implementation of today’s economic policy possible. There is therefore a logic of a project-architecture-economic policy, in which the architecture plays a pivotal role in the whole system.

 

This is the Gordian knot of the affair, and in this, it is the euro that is the mortar that allows for the functioning of the economic architecture. Thus a euro that obeys the desires of mercantile expansion, without paying attention to the profound asymmetries of the game, cuts off the capacity to confront these asymmetries and deepens them, with the consequences of poverty, vulnerability, financial bubbles, etc. The wheel keeps on turning, in spite of everything and, in the face of the interests of the popular majorities, will not stop, and its continuation can only be maintained on the basis of an ECB that is alien to the needs of the economy as a whole, with the discipline imposed on governments through the postulates of Maastricht, based on a pseudo-dictatorial economic direction on the part of the Troika. Because of this, the euro is not only a currency, but the spider’s web in which the structure of European economic and political power is woven. In this way, the debate around the euro is strategic with respect to the questions that have been raised, and which are those that in reality form the important dissent that exists at the present time, as we shall see.

 

 

Those on the left offer different answers to the question of how, when and from where it is possible to confront the economic architecture generated around the euro. In synthesis, we can find three different ways to approach this question.

 

In the first place, there are those that address the roots of the European project and its manifestation as economic policy, avoiding the relevance of economic architecture. They thus opt for a constituent process in the long term and on a continental basis, even as they severely criticise European economic policy (austerity) and those who put it in practice (Troika), but without proposing directly the overthrow of the present economic architecture. Because of this, they confide in the notion that the constituent process will in the future change this architecture, which at this time one should not attempt to change, since the risks of doing so – and of doing it unilaterally rather than continentally – are greater than the possible benefits to be obtained by leaving, or not adopting, the euro.

 

In the second place, there are those who do seek to approach the three aspects of the logic of the project-architecture-policy, proposing in the case of the architecture its reform through a political-fiscal union. In this way, the proposal involves an effort for a reform in depth of the Eurozone model of governance, a real transition from a mercantile and economistic European Union to a Europe that would assume its political nature, with a common fiscal policy, an ECB that supports the real economy, along with the universal recognition of certain citizens’ rights. All this would allow leverage to achieve the reduction of the present asymmetries, without any need to leave the euro (although some versions of these proposals involve some departure from European economic architecture with respect to the financing of the public deficit) [1]. We are therefore speaking of a significant change in this architecture, but without abandoning a common currency, with the pretension that progressive taxation would be capable of introducing some cohesion in the territory of the euro.

 

In both cases, the proposals are continental in character and never from the decision-making capacity of a determined country – or of a future independent state –; in both cases, the pertinence of rethinking the territorial framework of the European Union is not addressed, in spite of the evident asymmetries; here there is a clear option for a common currency. The difference between the two is that the first bases everything on a constituent process, while the second opts for a reform of the Eurozone based on greater political unity.

 

Finally, and in the third place, there are those who claim – and I include myself – that instead of placing all the stakes on a constituent process (which should not necessarily take place within the present territory of the EU or the Eurozone), it is necessary to mount a direct attack on the economic architecture in place and propose as a real and positive possibility the abandoning – or not entering – the euro, without having to wait for a broader continental process [2].

 

In this way, and of course following a necessary specific analysis of the risks, economic structure and geopolitical reality in every case, one opts for a priority on the agenda of abandonment – or non-entering – the euro, for the following two reasons: in the first place, because waiting for a continental process to overturn this situation could well be illusory in the present context, it being necessary to break down from whatever perspective the most clear manifestation of the project, which is simply the euro and its architecture; in the second place, because it is the only way to establish an emancipative and sovereign economic strategy from the institutional level, placing exchange, monetary and fiscal policies at its service, that at the present time have been captured by European economic architecture and its suicidal project.

 

In this sense, it is clear that to stay outside the euro has its costs (above all the initial shock), but we think that greater costs are involved for the citizenry within the euro and while the euro itself is not questioned. We recall, as we have already pointed out, the importance of this single currency in the European project, as the spider’s web that ties everything together in its totality. We can therefore assume, and we do assume, the complicated and risky impact of not being in the euro, but in the other direction, we face the following question: What to do, here and now, within the euro? Is any political and human emancipation possible, in an institutional context, within the euro?

 

Our answer is no, especially for countries on the periphery, since a state institutional framework cut off from its economic capacity (tied up in the spider’s web of the euro) leaves no margin for manoeuver, without holding any cards to bid on an emancipatory process within a purely capitalist structure. Because of this, it would be a sort of schizophrenic option in which one confronts the ultra-liberal European project even as one complies with its most glaring structural manifestations. All this, while waiting for a constituent process without any solid bases, of tremendous complexity, and with little projection over the long term. We do not have that much time.

 

At another level, there is uncertainty and the more than probably lack of viability involved also in the second option of a partial reform of the economic architecture without touching the euro. In the first place, in an illegitimate but powerful project such as that involved in the present hegemony, it means confiding in attaining sufficient continental majorities to move the process towards a political union, thus confronting the Troika. I believe that this is too much to hope for. In this sense, it is much more probable that these majorities could be achieved in the framework of an established state – or a future independent state – than in the framework of a Europe that is moving to the right and which would have to start from an extremely divided left. In the second place, and even of one were able to assemble sufficient force at a continental level for such a political-fiscal union, can we really think that taxation, at the present moment could constitute a sufficient lever for overcoming the enormous and growing inequalities? It looks like a lukewarm measure that waters down any emphasis on the urgent need of profound change.

 

In a word, and because of all the reasons exposed, our option is to derail the train of European economic architecture generated through the euro, with the abandonment – or non-acceptance – of a single currency as a necessary condition for undertaking any emancipatory process, and this after a serious analysis of the risks and capacities involved. Nevertheless, and as we have been saying throughout this text, we do not consider the euro only as a currency, but as the mortar, as a spider’s web, whose abandonment would allow us to break with the ECB, with the Troika and with Maastricht, so that keeping out of the euro involves a number of measures and an alternative socioeconomic model on which to base the aforesaid emancipatory process.

 

 

No to the euro is hence a measure that is necessary but not sufficient [3]. We think that there is no chance of emancipation – from the institutional reins – within the euro, even as we must say that it is not simply a question of replacing one currency with another (the euro for the dracma, the lira or the eusko), but of ensuring the minimal guarantees and capacities to develop a sovereign and emancipatory strategy, in the context of globalized capitalism and a determined correlation of forces.

 

In this sense, a no to the euro is no panacea, nor does it signify a liberation from all the constraints of the system, not at all. Nonetheless, within the limits of the system, this measure offers a greater capacity for action towards the processes of emancipation, and would inflict a hard blow on the capitalist and anti-democratic framework of the EU, thus involving a significant impact on the struggle against the status quo.

 

Given this, the no to the euro should be accompanied by a complete social-economic alternative proposal that on the one hand mitigates the shock generated by the leaving or not entering the euro and on the other, serves as a framework of reference for the non-capitalist projects that one hopes to establish.

 

Along these lines, and in first place, the no to the euro should be accompanied with a proposal for a social audit of the debt at a state level that could generate a suspension of payments (non-payment of illegitimate debt, renegotiation of legitimate debt) that in the last instance, avoids the permanent tombstone of the debt for a citizenry that was not involved in the process of the financial bubble.

 

In the second place, the no to the euro should go hand in hand with strong regulation and energetic action with respect to capital flow, along with public and/or social control of at least an important part of the financial system, which would permit the recovering of this system for a wider reproduction of life.

 

In the third place, this would involve public and/or social control of strategic sectors such as energy, telecommunications or transport, as public goods that should be freed from any mercantile logic.

 

In the fourth place, no to the euro would form part of a package of proposals for the dismantling of present European economic policy (international as well), eradicating the suppression of rights and the pro-corporation policies, such as the lamentable Common Agricultural Policy (PAC).

 

Finally, and in fifth place, no to the euro should be strictly tied to an unequivocal option for a socio-economic model that questions spaces for capitalism centred on new models of consumption and production, with the sustainability of life as a reference and with a base of closed circuits and an economy of solidarity as a framework for action.

 

In addition, as we have pointed out from the beginning of the article, it is necessary to align this proposal for a socio-economic alternative with an agenda for the political redefinition of Europe as a whole, on democratic and emancipatory bases. This would imply, first of all, the opening of a debate on the present territorial framework of the European Union, that may or may not be the right way to generate a political process in which to prioritize cohesion and horizontality; then it implies clearly establishing the foundational values of the process or the processes to be defined, so that they respond to the demands of the majority of the people; and finally, but not less important, it involves making explicit and favouring the exercise of self-determination for those nations that desire to become an independent State.

 

No to the euro is therefore a measure to take into account within a larger strategy, but in any case a fundamental measure. In this sense, if the conditions are present, it should be understood as a viable initiative that may be taken on, both in the return to older currencies or in the transitory creation of complementary currencies. But in any case, it should always be accompanied by an economic and political strategy that prefigures a serious way out of the present absurd situation, and which already allows the left to undertake an emancipatory pedagogy. 

 

In the end, the present economic architecture generated around the euro must be defeated. It must be attacked on all fronts without waiting for uncertain future processes. Within the present one, there is no way out. Outside of it, there is uncertainty, yes, but there are also new emancipatory horizons, for which the European left has a global responsibility. 

 

 

Notas:

 

[1] V.V.A.A: Manifiesto ¿Qué hacer con la deuda y el euro? available in http://www.vientosur.info/spip.php?article7930

 

[2] LAPAVITSAS, Crisis en la zona euro, Editorial Capitán Swing, 2013

 

[3] MONTERO SOLER, Alberto, Salir de la pesadilla del euro, 2014, available in http://www.rebelion.org/mostrar.php?tipo=5&id=Alberto%20Montero%20Soler&...