Alexander Main is the Senior Associate for International Policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. In his work at CEPR, Alexander focuses on U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean and regularly engages with U.S. policy makers and civil society groups. His analyses on U.S. policy in the Americas have been published in a variety of media outlets such as the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Foreign Policy, Los Angeles Times, NACLA and the Monde Diplomatique

In the following interview, Alexander Main, Senior Associate for International Policy, shares his sharp and critical point of view regarding the positions of Republican and Democratic candidates who are running in the Primary elections, about the US War on Drugs; the “free trade agreements”; the migration issue; the turnabout in US-Cuban relations; the possible future of the relations with non-partner governments of the US, such as Bolivia and Venezuela, as well as the role that the Argentinian government of Mauricio Macri could play within the region. All these aspects are crucial for the future of Nuestra América (Our America).

- Will there be any difference between a Republican or Democratic president regarding the war on drugs? Will they encourage different projects or will they keep a regional security/ militarization approach as we saw during the administrations of Clinton (Plan Colombia), George W. Bush (Plan Colombia, Andean Regional Initiative) and Obama (Merida Initiative and Central American Regional Security Initiative –in spite of the efforts of the current administration to enhance soft power measures, such as improving justice systems, development assistance, etc.)?

- Within the United States political establishment there is a growing consensus in favor of criminal justice reform, with key political figures from both the Democratic and Republican parties effectively calling for a reversal of domestic “drug war” policy through significant lightening of mandatory sentences for possession of illegal drugs and more and more states either legalizing marijuana or allowing its use for medicinal purposes.

However, there is no indication that leading policy makers from either party are contemplating a similar de-escalation of the U.S.-backed drug war internationally.  On the contrary, the U.S. is investing more in militarized counternarcotics programs in places like Central America’s Northern Triangle and is supporting a dramatic increase in training programs led by thousands of Colombian military officials trained in counterinsurgency and counternarcotics tactics under Plan Colombia. The deep influence of the defense industry on Republican and Democratic policymakers is in part responsible for the continuation of the “war on drugs” beyond U.S. borders.

Unless Bernie Sanders becomes president – and that possibility is increasingly remote – one can expect that either a Democratic or Republican presidency will continue the sort of militarized, heavy-handed security programs in the Western Hemisphere that were first expanded under the administration of Bill Clinton. These programs will only come under real scrutiny in the U.S. if significant national constituencies – for instance Latin American immigrant community organizations – begin campaigning against them. The only other possibility of change is if Latin American governments themselves begin rejecting the “drug war” and adopt alternative policies; and this is difficult given some countries’ growing reliance on U.S. security assistance.

- If Democrats win, would they be able (finally) to implement an immigration reform as Hillary Clinton promised, a “comprehensive immigration reform with a pathway to citizenship” or as Sanders says “a fair and human immigration policy”? And if Republicans win, if Trump becomes president, would he carry out his campaign promises (“Make Mexico pay for the wall”) or are they just propaganda?

- There might be some progress on this issue under either a Democratic or Republican president given the growing demographic importance of Latinos and each party’s long-term objective of winning over members of Latino communities.  However, Republican lawmakers in Congress – whose base constituencies are often white and anti-immigrant – can be expected to obstruct substantive immigration reform initiatives. If Republicans maintain their majority in the House of Representatives, which is likely, there’s little chance that they’ll approve legislation that provides a legal status to a significant portion of the millions of undocumented immigrants in the U.S.

Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders would undoubtedly use their presidential powers to maintain and extend executive actions like the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) which provides a broad category of young undocumented immigrants with renewable two-year work permits and exemption from deportation.  Sanders would almost certainly aim to protect a broader range of undocumented immigrants from deportation than Clinton would, based on the positions they’ve expressed during the presidential campaign. Both Clinton and Sanders would undoubtedly push for comprehensive immigration reform, but a Republican-dominated House would block their efforts.

Trump is a wild card: his campaign, with its focus on the Republican primaries, currently aims to appeal to the white, anti-immigrant base of the Republican party; but he is notorious for changing positions when it is useful to do so, and it is possible that in a general election he will soften his stance towards immigrants to some degree.  And if he were to become president, he might well soften his position even more and even show himself to be in favor of an amnesty for broad categories of undocumented immigrants, as he has done before in the past.  It should be noted that, in their attempt to conquer the most votes from the Republican base, all of the Republican candidates have engaged in tough anti-immigrant rhetoric, with even Marco Rubio pledging to focus on border security rather than immigration reform.

So, the answer is: yes, for Trump and other Republican candidates, outrageous anti-immigrant statements are mostly rhetoric aimed at winning primary elections.

- Free Trade Agreements have led to controversial results in Colombia, México and Central America (deepening commodity and energy export dependency, increasing financial dependency, cheap labor force, etc.). Do you notice any difference in the way in which Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump will tackle this? Will they still develop the Pacific Alliance and sign the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement? (Considering also the consequences for specific sectors within American economy)

- So-called “free trade agreements”, which actually involve protective measures that favor multinational companies, are strongly opposed by Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump.  While Sanders’ voting record suggests that his opposition is entirely genuine, there are good reasons to suspect that Trump’s positions are derived from his electoral strategy, given that his own business interests, and those of his network stand to profit from such agreements. Meanwhile, Hillary Clinton is officially opposed to the Trans Pacific Partnership international trade agreement supported by the Obama administration.  However, her credibility on this issue is undermined by her past support for TPP (which she characterized as the “gold standard” of trade agreements) when she was Secretary of State and her support for most “free trade agreements” while she was Senator, and NAFTA while she was First Lady in the late 1990s.

The Pacific Alliance was developed with strong U.S. support while Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State.  Its clear purpose is to foster divisions in Latin America and weaken regional economic and political integration efforts that don’t involve the U.S., such as Mercosur and UNASUR.  This matches Clinton’s aggressive attempts to marginalize and get rid of left-leaning governments throughout Latin America, as exemplified in her hostility toward countries like Venezuela and the measures she took that allowed the rightwing coup in Honduras to succeed.  As president, Clinton can be expected to continue to support the Pacific Alliance and similar strategies to divide Latin America.

If Clinton becomes president she can be expected to continue to pursue the “free trade” agenda, though her campaign promise to oppose TPP will create a dilemma for her should Congress fail to ratify the treaty before the end of 2016.  If TPP is only voted on by the U.S. Congress in 2017, which looks increasingly likely, Clinton may find herself obliged to publicly oppose the treaty while effectively doing nothing to prevent its Congressional passage.

- How much can the big corporation lobby influence decision making on foreign relations with governments that are not US “partners”, such as Bolivia and Venezuela? Do you think there will be any difference depending on a Republican or Democratic administration?

- Corporate lobbies have played a major role in shaping the so-called “free trade” agenda that has been promoted by Republican and Democratic administrations alike. The first major corporate-backed trade agreement following World War II, the “Kennedy Round” of the negotiations within the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) framework, was initiated by President Kennedy and concluded under President Johnson, both Democrats.  The “Uruguay Round” of GATT negotiations was initiated under Republican President Ronald Reagan, concluded under Democratic President Clinton, and led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), an entity whose rules have been designed in large part by multinational corporations.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was a boon to U.S. manufacturers and agribusiness and led to lower wages and the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of blue collar jobs in the U.S., was first signed by Republican President George H.W. Bush and subsequently added to and promoted by President Clinton who also launched the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas.  President George W. Bush signed free trade agreements with Chile, Peru, Central America and Colombia, while President Obama pushed for Congressional approval of the Colombia FTA and launched negotiations for the TPP agreement, which one union leader has referred to as a “massive giveaway to corporate special interests.”

This is simply to help illustrate the profound influence of corporate lobbies over U.S. administrations, whether Democratic or Republican.  Increasingly, major U.S. corporations and banks are deeply involved in the trade agreement drafting process, while the general public, and even members of Congress, aren’t allowed to view the draft texts of agreements.  Similarly, major corporations and banks are in part responsible for U.S. promotion of neoliberal policies (privatization of public services, public sector downsizing, labor market deregulation, etc.) abroad, for instance through conditionalities attached to multilateral loans, and through U.S. development “assistance” programs whose aim is to make countries more attractive to foreign investors.

When governments in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela reject the U.S. free trade agenda and the imposition of neoliberal policies, they are quickly seen as problematic by the U.S. foreign policy establishment, which also has deep links to corporate and financial sectors, and government agencies like the State Department and the Treasury Department.  Hence left-leaning governments in these countries have encountered hostility from both Republican and Democratic administrations.

The level of this hostility and the tactics deployed to undermine or topple these governments, does vary to some extent between Republican and Democratic administrations, and is influenced by other actors within government bureaucracies – for instance, aggressive “cold warriors” that can still be found in the State Department – and ultra-conservative constituencies such as some Cuban-American groups in Florida and New Jersey, and some pro-Israel sectors. These latter groups tend to have a stronger influence over Republican administrations, which explains to some extent why the Bush administration’s support for the 2002 coup in Venezuela was so vigorous.

- What is the most likely future of Cuban-US relations?

- Under Obama, U.S. official policy toward Cuba has seen a significant shift – from a policy of non-recognition of the Cuban government and efforts to achieve regime change through diplomatic isolation, an economic blockade and brazen attempts to subvert Cuban institutions, to a policy of diplomatic normalization and economic and political engagement. However, the U.S. government has not wavered from its goal of regime change; it simply hopes to achieve it by promoting economic liberalism on the island and by seeking to undermine support for the Cuban government within the general population.

The Cuban government seems well aware of U.S. intentions, and is proceeding cautiously and deliberately in the process of economic and political rapprochement with the U.S. government and business community.  Though the Cuban economy could benefit greatly from increased trade with the U.S. and an infusion of U.S. capital, Cuban leaders are surely aware of the dangers posed by unequal economic growth on the island, where certain privileged sectors, with existing ties to Cuban-American sources of capital investment, can potentially capture a much greater proportion of increased national income than other sectors. If somewhat equitable redistributive mechanisms are not firmly established, there is a significant risk that those Cubans that have gained the most from the Cuban revolution and that form the most solid base of support for the government will quickly become disgruntled, posing a major challenge to the sustainability of the current socialist regime.

- What role could Macri’s Argentina play in the US hemispheric strategy?

- The victory of Mauricio Macri in last year’s presidential elections is perhaps the most significant defeat for the Latin American left in over 15 years, and the U.S. government hasn’t lost time trying to capitalize on it.  First of all, by throwing financial and political support behind Macri’s administration and promoting quick deals between U.S. corporations and Argentine companies (Obama’s recent visit coincided with a business conference featuring more than 800 U.S. and Argentine CEOs). Secondly by promoting the new Argentine government as a regional leader with a clear pro-U.S., pro-neoliberal and anti-left agenda. President Obama’s recent remarks alongside his Argentine counterpart give us some idea of the hopes that the U.S. administration has for the Macri government:

Argentina is reassuming its traditional leadership role in the region and around the world.  And on a range of areas, we discussed the ways in which the United States and Argentina can be strong global partners to promote the universal values and interests that we share.

Concretely, the U.S. would like to see the Macri government reshape and reorient the Mercosur bloc, which in recent years has incorporated Venezuela – which the U.S. seeks to isolate internationally – and has focused on consolidating a regional integration process that doesn’t include the U.S.  Argentine foreign minister Malcorra has hinted that Argentina will seek to open up Mercosur to a trade agreement with the United States, while Macri attacked the Venezuelan government during a Mercosur summit last year.  In a recent meeting with Malcorra, Secretary of State John Kerry publicly supported Macri’s aggressive statements against Venezuela:

We look forward today to talking about the ways in which we can focus on a number of different issues together (…) on some of the regional challenges, particularly, for instance, Venezuela, where Argentina has made some very important contributions already.

It is clear that the U.S. hopes to reinitiate a strong partnership with the Argentine government, reminiscent of the deep relationship that existed during Carlos Menem’s presidency.

- If a Democratic president is elected, how likely is it that they will focus on domestic policy as opposed to foreign policy (following the party’s tradition)? And if a Republican president is elected, how likely will they focus on foreign policy as part of the project to “make America great again”?

- At this stage, the most likely scenario is that a Democrat will win the presidency, and it is highly likely that that Democrat will be Hillary Clinton. Though Bernie Sanders’ critique of the corporate-influenced political system and support for an unabashed social democratic agenda has helped galvanize a highly successful “insurgent” campaign, Hillary Clinton retains a distinct advantage thanks to the backing of the Democratic establishment and minority and older voters (that are more likely to participate in primaries).  And polls suggest that in a one-on-one race with the Republican frontrunner Trump, both Clinton and Sanders would win by a landslide.

In the unlikely case that Sanders wins the Democratic primary contest he can be expected to significantly downscale U.S. intervention abroad, in keeping with his largely anti-interventionist stances over his many decades in politics. Absent a foreign policy crisis (e.g., a major terrorist attack on the U.S.) he will undoubtedly focus primarily on domestic issues and seek to swing the domestic policy agenda back to the path of progressive social welfare expansion that prevailed for decades (from the mid-1930s to the early 1970s).   He can be expected to seek to significantly downsize the U.S. military budget and can be expected to encounter stiff resistance from Republicans and mainstream Democrats in Congress.

Again, Hillary will likely be the next occupant of the White House and one could expect her to quickly renege on the progressive positions adopted during the primary campaign (e.g., opposition to the TPP, taking tough measures to reign in Wall Street speculation, raising the minimum wage, etc.) and to put into practice her hawkish foreign policy positions, and seek to expand U.S. intervention abroad and implement more aggressive “containment” policies against so-called enemy states such as Iran and Venezuela.  However, there is little doubt that, should Clinton win the primary contest, Bernie Sanders will seek to leverage the strong grassroots support he has acquired to force Hillary to support a more progressive agenda. For instance by conditioning his political support to her candidacy on sustained commitments to abide by a progressive agenda.

Unfortunately, Sanders’ base and Sanders himself have been much more focused on the domestic agenda than on the foreign policy agenda, and it is likely that pressure for her to step away from hawkish positions will be fairly weak barring the development of a strong, organized anti-war movement.

Should Trump end up president – an unlikely scenario indeed – he could well be less of a hawk than Clinton on the foreign policy front. His motto of “make America great again” is actually more focused on calls for domestic economic national renewal than on a muscular foreign policy. Trump may make outrageous xenophobic comments – directed in particular at Muslims, both in the U.S. and abroad – and he may talk about strengthening the military and bombing “the hell” out of ISIS, but more generally he has voiced opposition to an expansion of U.S. interventionism and has taken up unorthodox positions, e.g., criticizing U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and calling for neutrality in the Israel-Palestine mediation process (though he has also presented himself as Israel’s biggest supporter).  His consistent opposition to the TPP also sets him apart in the Republican field, which is overwhelmingly pro “free trade.”

Of course, Trump’s positions on many issues have been in constant flux and is seems that his main concern is galvanizing the disenchanted Republican base, which – like most of the U.S. public – is not supportive of U.S. imperial projection abroad and concerned that it is undermining the domestic economy.  Whether Trump would seek to maintain the support of this base once president, or whether he would re-consider his positions in order to placate the Republican leadership, is an open question.

Though Trump has had a strong lead in the Republican primaries, the Republican leadership appears poised to take measures to try to prevent him from winning the primary contest through technical maneuvers at the Republican Convention in July.  If they do this and are successful in their maneuvering then the party’s presidential candidate is likely to be Texas Senator Ted Cruz, who is unpopular within the party establishment but seen as more controllable than Trump.

A Cruz presidency can be expected to be aggressively interventionist and to carry out an expanded “war against terrorism.”  Cruz is militantly pro-Israel and, as a result, will likely follow through with his promise to “rip up” the Iran nuclear agreement and could put the U.S. on the track of military intervention against Iran.  He can also be expected to intervene more aggressively against left governments and movements in Latin America.

- Silvina M. Romano is a member of the Latin American Strategic Center of Geopolitics -Centro Estratégico Latinoamericano de Geopolítica (CELAG). She is also a researcher at the Institute of Latin America and Caribbean Studies -Instituto de Estudios de América Latina y el Caribe (IEALC), National Council of Scientific and Technical Research - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET); Universidad de Buenos Aires, Marcelo T. de Alvear 2230 3º piso of. 314(C1122AAJ) Buenos Aires, Argentina.