To many of my fellow countrymen I have asked: How do you believe that we can get out of this situation? One of the responses is: “Maduro should leave”. This solution coincides with the principal public demand made by the government of the United States. Imagine for a moment that the constitutional president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, renounces the mandate to which he was democratically elected in May of last year, and then new elections are held. What would be the characteristics of this scenario?

First of all, I estimate that the government of the US would designate the people who exercise the leadership in this stage, who would not be those who are now in the public arena, given the lack of conditions of the Venezuelan opposition to come to agreement; a measure already employed in similar situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

In this imagined situation, the acceptance of the results of an election by the political actors would be conditioned, in particular the government of the United States would only recognize as valid those elections in which their candidates win. A contrary result would be qualified as fraud, in spite of an agreement to renew the election body, with the consent of those involved.

Let us say that the candidate of the opposition wins the “free elections” and forms a government, whose capacity of operation I think would be greatly affected by the action of the Chavista political actors who possess resources and capacities of mobilization. A scenario similar to the present state.

These political actors would be affected since they would have to govern in the framework of the 1999 Constitution promoted by Chávez, as well as interacting in a State where there are five powers and the others would not be in the same line (except for the National Assembly -AN- in disobedience), in addition with governors, regional deputies, mayors and advisers of Chavism. They would struggle with an organized participative social fabric, where communal councils, collectives and communes, that even if they are distant from their initial purposes, together make up a considerable social force. Finally they would have to lead a National Armed Force that is now Bolivarian and is profoundly influenced by Chavista thinking.

In contrast, the leadership in the hypothetical government would count on business associations, "civil society organizations" with shallow roots in the population, media companies and an endless number of new media that operate in social networks.

This exercise allows us to deduce that the U.S. government actually assumes a long-term strategy in order to affect all possible support, not only for the Bolivarian government, but also for the Bolivarian revolution, and in this way would not only count on power, but also on a correlation of forces that allows it to maintain power and have the capacity (including force) to implement a project that claims to be an alternative to Chavism. Their current tactic is controlled asphyxia of the Venezuelan population, so the aggression is dosed, so sabotage of the national electric system is a chapter of this history. In this sense, it suits them that the opposition actors under their subordination maintain their current positions and ignore all mediation initiatives, even those promoted by entities that show them support, such as the contact group of the European Union.

This strategy has a global reach, since by stifling the Bolivarian revolution it seeks not only to indefinitely postpone any alternative in Venezuela, but also to teach a lesson to those in the region or in the world who may have intentions to promote political processes alternative to capital.

This orientation would provide other benefits internally and externally, in relation to the former, by maintaining and broadening the base of support for national opposition actors, who have repeatedly disillusioned their followers by making promises they do not keep. As for the latter, the U.S. government is seeking to demonstrate its geopolitical superiority by acting with bellicose rhetoric in its natural zone of influence and as a result calibrates the responses of China and Russia, as well as of their allies.

In practical terms, it is possible that the perspective may be to reach the middle of Nicolás Maduro's term of office and promote a recall referendum, but with the people in deplorable conditions and with an immense rejection of the Chavista imagery. The principle of a series of electoral victories that will allow advancing towards the accelerated control of the State, culminating once again in the modification of the constitutional framework.

To understand this state of affairs, it is useful to take into account two reference points.  The first is related to the ascent of Hugo Chávez to power in 1998, through a democratic process, but in the midst of a burn-out of the actors and the dominant political system, since the decade of the sixties; the second is that the person who is at the forefront of designing the US government's policy towards Venezuela is Elliott Abrams, who in the 1980s worked out a long-term strategy to affect the support of the Nicaraguan people for the Sandinista National Liberation Front, whose main actor ended up being the violent "contra".

Within this framework we can understand the realities experienced by the Venezuelan people at this time, such as the current deprivation of public electricity and water supply, in addition to access to food, transport, energy, hyperinflation, among others, which in short can be described as an accelerated decline in the level of welfare achieved up to now.

The majority reaction of the Venezuelan people to this strategy as a whole has been resistance, because they yearn for peace and act accordingly. The official discourse of the Bolivarian government systematically ignores the daily gestures, which lead to organizing solidarity networks that are much more effective and lasting than the institutional assistance mechanisms, as well as the processes of attrition that have been occurring in important sectors of the population, especially the most vulnerable. If they are incorporated, they are instrumentalized.

Significant sectors of the population reject the interfering and aggressive policy of the US government, undertaken fundamentally through unilateral measures; although on the other hand, there is a worrying increase of those who are willing to sacrifice fundamental aspects of our republican and democratic legacy, such as self-determination as a country or our sovereignty, with the hope of returning to the "great Venezuela" in its version of the 4^th or 5^th Republic.

At present, the Bolivarian government is working to build a coherent direction that will allow it to maximize state resources and optimize coordination, for which it encounters some internal difficulties, such as the struggle of interest groups within Chavism and growing corruption as mechanisms for their progress. Significantly, they maintain a capacity to mobilize popular sectors in the street. At the international level, China and Russia are so far giving strong support that affects the conduct of the politics of interference of the US government.

Finally, on the one hand it should not be forgotten that Chavism has the National Constituent Assembly, which until now has acted as a deterrent, and on the other hand, there are sectors in this line that do not rule out the use of force to maintain power, and these sectors particularly have the capacity to do so.

Today the Venezuelan people must begin to equip themselves with organizational capacities to live in a context where well-being is likely to be compromised in the medium and long term and within this, Chavism is challenged to overcome its contradictions in order to revitalize itself. As for the Bolivarian government, responding to the contingency is a key task, but it must not forget that when a window of opportunity is opened it must go on the offensive, fundamentally in the economic plane where for years it has not achieved sustainable results.

When they say "all the options are on the table," we should not think only of the quick or short-term ones.

- Jesús A. Rondón, sociologist.

@jxrondon