After having destroyed the democratic process in Bolivia last November 10 with the execution of a hybrid Coup d’État against the government of Evo Morales Aymo under the argument that he had produced an electoral fraud, imperialism and their internal allies are intensely developing a policy of judicial-police scrutiny over former authorities and in particular over leaders of social forces and popular policies. Their objective is to restore a conservative neoliberal regime aligned with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the orientations of Donald Trump for Latin America and the Caribbean, and to dismantle the social and economic advances of the last fifteen years.

In spite of its “transitory” character, the government of the self-proclaimed President Jeannine Añez, Senator of a party (Movimiento Demócrata Social MDS) that failed to reach five per cent of the votes, is adopting structural measures oriented to weakening the National State, the internal market, the endogenous economy based on the recuperation of natural resources and their industrialization, and national sovereignty. Añez assumed her post supported by a police mutiny, military insubordination and a strong urban mobilization of middle-class and wealthy sectors, which was rejected by two thirds of the senators and house members, representing the Movement for Socialism (MAS), by the popular movements and part of the international community.

As was to be expected, the US government has placed key figures in the heart of the government: they have Erick Foronda, twenty-fifth functionary of the Embassy of the United States in La Paz, as the Private Secretary of the President; Jorge Quiroga as an international spokesperson in his position as agent of the “gusano” groups of Miami Cubans; and Senator Oscar Ortiz, a defeated MDS presidential candidate linked to US political foundations, as the parliamentary linkage for the decisions of regional power groups from Eastern Bolivia. The majority of the ministers are members of the MDS Party, of an ultraneoliberal and supremacist tendency, based mainly in Santa Cruz and Beni, where the landowning oligarchs, dedicated to agro-industry of soya exportation and cattle raising, are extremely powerful.

Economic and international policy orientations

Three economic decisions with respect to agroindustry have been taken rapidly in recent weeks: the full liberation of exports of soya and foods prioritizing external markets and opening the risk of rising prices in the internal market and risks for the exchange rate; the approval of regulations that consolidate large-scale cattle-raising in Beni, continuing decisions of the last government in order to export beef to China; and the authorization to utilize contingency resources of the Bolivian Central Bank for 2800 million bolivianos (1 boliviano = 6,9 US$), to pay salaries and other administrative expenses.

With reference to the strategic state enterprises of Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) and the Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB), the former (oil and gas), the main source of income for the country for social and territorial redistribution, at present in an intense process of industrialization, and the latter (lithium), considered the basis of the future economy, it is notable that the large transnationals have them both in their sights for privatization and control, considering that the world lithium market is fundamental for advanced technology production with high international prices, while gas is the key to business with the markets of Brazil and Argentina.

In international policy, the transition government has also adopted rapid decisions that are completely distinct from the previous ones, with the objective of joining the regional strategy of domination of the United States and dismantling the processes of Latin America and Caribbean integration and unity. Bolivia has withdrawn from the Alternativa Bolivariana de las Américas (ALBA) and from the Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas (UNASUR) and has joined the Lima Group, recognising as President of Venezuela the self-proclaimed Juan Guaidó, and has supported the US positions in the Organization of American States (OAS).

Bilateral relations with Mexico and Argentina have suffered a deep schism due to discrepancies with respect to the exile and political asylum granted to Evo Morales, first by Andrés Lopez Obrador and then by Alberto Fernández, marking a tension that reached an extreme now that the Mexican Government has presented a demand before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of the Hague, because it considers that their Diplomatic Seat in La Paz is under siege by police and intelligence forces, thus violating the Vienna Convention.

In the Embassy, various ex-ministers of the former government have sought asylum and are accused of “sedition and terrorism” by the present government.

Meanwhile, the Government of Brazil, the most important economic and political power of the region, presided over by Jair Bolsonaro, rapidly recognized, as did the United States, the government of Añez, and the Bolivian authorities of the energy and hydrocarbon sector have taken actions to renegotiate the export of gas to the neighbouring country, considered the most important commercial partner of Bolivia.  The two governments also have significant similarities on political and religious matters and on the rights of women and minorities. The other neighbouring countries have been cautious in the face of the Bolivian crisis at a very dynamic moment of regional and world geopolitics.

Political crisis and the search for a way out

In the framework of the advance and consolidation of the Coup d’État, massive anti-Evo mobilizations took place, headed by the civic leaders of Santa Cruz, Fernando Camacho, and of Potosí, Marco Punari, by the presidential candidate Carlos Mesa of Comunidad Ciudadana and by well organized groups of young people across the country, especially the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista and the Resistencia Juvenil Cochala. They confronted the social and trade union movements and humiliated dissidents, with the support of the various media outlets, among them the Pagina Siete newspaper and the international television channel CNN.  They were confronted by the resistance of the indigenous and peasant movements and the urban-popular inhabitants of La Paz, who suffered the massacres of Sacaba (Cochabamba) and Senkata (El Alto) due to the armed action of military and police forces, that left a total of 25 dead, of the 34 in the whole country, and several hundred wounded and detained, according to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

The actions of resistance intensified when police and civic groups withdrew and burned the national symbol of the Wiphala flag, that represents the native and indigenous cultures, along with racist and religious discourse defending religious fundamentalism with the slogan “The Bible returns to the Palace of Government”. This situation of confrontation and its consequences of the dead and wounded was investigated both by the UN Human Rights Council and by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR), that in their reports, the latter approved in an official session of the OAS, condemned the assassinations, the human rights violations and warned of the risk of impunity.

An official communiqué of the OAS, 296/19 of the 19^th of November of 2019, affirms: “The IACHR takes note that on the 12^th of November the minority block of the Senate–which was called and voted without the required quorum–elected the new leader of the legislative body who declared herself to be the interim President of Bolivia, and that the Constitutional Tribunal supported her claim. The IACHR understands that it is necessary to install a representative and inclusive process of public national dialogue, in order to name the members of a renewed electoral authority and to organize transparent and inclusive elections within 90 days, in order to achieve a constitutionally valid solution”. (Our translation)

In this context and in the search for the pacification of Bolivia, a parliamentary agreement, under mediation of the European Union (EU) between the government of Jeannine Añez and the political forces that support her and the Senators and Members of the Movement for Socialism (MAS), with a representation of two thirds of the assembly, determined the formation of a new Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the holding of elections in the first months of the year 2020 and the adoption of a law of constitutional guarantees to avoid the political persecution of those who are now in opposition.

The electoral panorama in 2020

The Electoral Tribunal has announced that in the first days of 2020, the call will be launched for national elections with a date as yet to be defined, although it is estimated that the first round will take place in April, and if necessary, a second round in May. This will require a legal definition with respect to the duration of the mandate of the present parliament, since its sessions would normally end on January 22^nd 2020, a situation that will demand an “interpretation” by the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) that could extend this mandate along with that of President Añez.

In these political-electoral times, the possible scenarios emerge with respect to candidates and their possibilities of participating in the ballots: two citizens’ organizations opposed to MAS have filed an action with the Electoral Tribunal, requesting it to cancel the MAS movement, considering that it is responsible for the supposed fraud of last October 20.  Such a decision would lead to an unsustainable political and social situation, due to the popular support of trades unions, indigenous organizations, peasants, urban-dwellers and social movements for the party of Evo Morales.

While the candidacies are not yet defined, it is possible to undertake an analysis of political forces and the candidates that would take part in the elections.

The MAS, that has agreed to elect Evo Morales, a refugee in Argentina, as their head of the electoral campaign, maintains a high preference among the voting population of the whole country, having as potential candidates Andrónico Rodríguez, the young cocalero leader from the Chapare, Luis Arce, successful ex Minister of Economy and finances, David Choquehuanca, former Foreign Minister, Diego Pary, also former Foreign Minister, Adriana Salvatierra, present Senator, and Leonilda Zurita, historic leader of MAS. It is most probable that from among these figures will be elected the presidential ticket, in an assembly of MAS in mid January.

The potential of MAS could be weakened if there are divisions, some already evident of parliamentary sectors prone to a “pacific cohabitation” with the present government and certain leaders who demand attention to their proposals. The electoral support that the movement received in 2005 was 54%, in 2009 64%, in 2014 61% and in 2019 47%.

Among the political, civic and citizens’ forces that achieved the resignation of Evo Morales, there are old and new candidacies:

Comunidad Ciudadana (CC) has ratified its previous electoral ticket: Carlos Mesa and Gustavo Pedraza, who in October obtained 36% of the votes. After having been a political party with a threatening discourse, they chose a low profile in the present governmental scheme and their presidential candidate has even indicated that he will give continuity to some of Evo Morales’ policies. They have important political agreements with the Mayor of the City of La Paz, Luis Revilla, and with the Governor of Tarija, Adrián Oliva. They were supported by the businessman and head of Unidad Nacional (UN), Samuel Doria Medina, who might maintain his decision or retract his support and define his own candidacy or the formation of another electoral block.

The candidate of Korean origin Chi Hyun Chung, who surprisingly obtained 8% of the votes in the past elections, has been left without his political group, the PDC, and has announced his candidacy but does not have a party to support him, as would be legally required.

The civic-political revelation of this period is Fernando Camacho – who commanded the uprising that led to the expulsion of Morales and entered the Governmental Palace on November 10 with a Bible and a “letter of resignation” of the ex president – has announced his candidacy, receiving the adhesion of various political groups (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolutionario MNR, Partido Demócrata Cristiana PDC, Unidad Civica Solidaridad UCS, and the Partido Acción Nacional PANBOL), having generated great expectation due to his support-base in significant social sectors in Santa Cruz and Eastern Bolivian and support obtained in other cities of the country.

When it appeared that he would be on a joint ticket with the important civic leader of Potosí, Marco Pumari, a distancing took place between them among allegations of extortion, illegal recordings, requests for money and political posts in the present government. There is speculation over what will be the electoral decisions among these leaders, Camacho being a strong candidate due to the characteristics of his leadership.  An important ex-minister and former Mayor of La Paz, of neoliberal tendency, Ronald Maclean, has even been publically presented as Camacho’s Campaign Director.

Finally great uncertainly remains around the electoral posture and the candidates of the Party that controls the government at the present time, the MDS, also known as the Democrats, who have as their national chief the Governor of the powerful Department of Santa Cruz, Ruben Costas, and whose candidate in the last elections, Senator Oscar Ortiz, obtained barely 4% of the votes. One cannot discard various possibilities of candidates: Costas could be a strong candidate, without disregarding the present President Jeannine Añez who has received important support in her region, Beni, although also, the ex governor of Beni, Ernesto Suárez, could be a possible option. It is possible that the MDS could make a pact with Camacho.

This panorama will slowly be clarified in the coming weeks, when the electoral dates are published, including those for the registration of candidates, and the candidacies are defined along with the electoral campaigns, in the midst of fear and doubts. According to the precedents and the first opinion polls, the MAS has the greatest support of the population, followed by CC and, if they present the candidatures mentioned above, the MAS would win the first round of the elections but with difficulties to maintain a victory in a second round in the face of an alliance among all the other political parties that would support the second most voted.

The greatest uncertainty, nevertheless, is the decision and orientations that will come from the dominant imperialist strategy of the United States, with all their mechanisms of intervention, in the fear of a new electoral victory of MAS and the phantasm of Evo Morales.

02/01/2020

(Translated for ALAI by Jordan Bishop)

- Eduardo Paz Rada is a Bolivian Sociologist and professor at the UMSA. He writes for publications in Bolivia and Latin America.