"Good Governance" and the Mdgs: Contradictory or Complementary?
14/10/2004
- Opinión
(This paper was first presented at the Institute for Global Network,
Information and Studies (IGNIS) conference in Oslo, 20 September 2004.)
THE POST COLD WAR CONTEXT
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and good
governance, among other initiatives, were products of the post-
Cold War period, and today may be victims of the post- post-Cold
War period. Context analysis is crucial before we proceed to
unpack the concepts. Given the security-obsessed times in which
we now live, we may even look back with nostalgia at the early
1990s when there was a gradual elaboration of an expanded
normative framework for international affairs under the UN
umbrella. Indeed, in the early part of the decade, a series of
international conferences sought to generate a global agenda on
issues ranging from population and sustainable development to
human rights and gender. These conferences served to underline
the importance of multilateral approaches to addressing global
problems and affirmed the role of the United Nations as an
important instrument of global governance.
In many ways, the Millennium Declaration was a culmination of
these processes and provided a global plan of action to deal with
the world's most persistent problems.
The MDGs formed part of an innovative international approach to
international affairs firmly grounded on the concept of "liberalism" as
fundamental to peace and economics. According to that approach rooted in
Western history, political and economic liberalization would be effective
antidotes to violent conflict and to poverty and underdevelopment, all
under the tutelage of the rich countries and in particular a new United
Nations revitalized after the disappearance of the Soviet Union. Thus,
promotion of human rights, democracy, elections, constitutionalism, rule
of law, property rights, good governance, neo-liberal economics have
become part and parcel of the international peacebuilding/good governance
project as well as the basis for a rapid surge in social and economic
affairs.
NORMATIVE PROBLEMS
In much of the development debate today, the notion of
governance has been presented as the missing link to successful
growth and economic "reform" including the attainment of the
MDGs. (1) But governance has diverse understandings. There is
one that is people-centered and there is another-unfortunately
predominant--which in our opinion takes us away from democracy
and the possibilities of genuine development (including the
attainment of the MDGs). In essence, a faulty notion of "good
governance" is taking us away from the goals because it entails
placing the state and society at the service of the market, under
the presumption that economic growth alone will deliver
development.
A discussion over governance is important because it influences
not only mechanisms but also strategies, each of which in turn
responds to ideological presumptions about development and
the means to attain greater economic democracy. Unfortunately,
the overly-eager leadership of the World Bank in framing the good
governance debate, as with the UNDP and World Bank
partnership to implement the MDGs, tends to narrow the
possibilities for a critical examination of the World Bank's role in
crating poverty and malgovernance through their structural adjustment
programs and "state modernization" schemes. Questioning the global trade
and finance regime, and global political malgovernance, is clearly outside
the hegemonic discussion parameters-to avoid approaching malgovernance,
hunger and extreme poverty as political issues, preferring instead to
leave them in the hands of highly-paid "technical" experts.
Poverty, hunger and bad government cannot be eliminated
without the democratization of policy making to the most local
level possible. This in essence would be a critical feature of
democratic governance. Unfortunately decision-making is going
in the other direction, as it is increasingly concentrated in the
hands of a few multilateral institutions.
GOOD GOVERNANCE A LA WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
In this paper, we will concentrate on the official Bretton Woods
institution's line on governance, examining it in its own terms.
According to the Washington Consensus, good governance
consists essentially as the political administration of economic
policies: the deregulation of exchange, trade and prices systems,
the preferential treatment of individual and corporate investors,
while eliminating governmental involvement in credit allocation. In
short, all measures necessary to complement and reinforce neo- liberal
economic policies while leaving the social model untouched. The chief
presumption being that attracting investment and "aid" is critical to long
term development, and that good governance is the link between the two.
The state is the other actor critical in this debate over MDGs and
good governance. The state was one of the first victims of the
post-Cold War ideological and cultural offensive, virtually
"satanizing" the state while exalting the virtues of the market.
Intellectuals and to some degree populations came to believe
that governments were responsible for all evils. A couple of
decades down the line there is a reconsideration of the
assumptions that the state is evil and inefficient while markets are good
and efficient.
Donor rediscovery of the state (good governance) is somewhat
suspect. In the face of multiplying zones of conflict and increasing
poverty after more than a decade of neoliberal policy fixes, it is not
surprising that multilateral agencies are looking for explanations. Of
course neoliberalism is not to blame. Instead, we have a new explanation
of the deteriorating social environment: the absence of "good governance"
and the existence of corruption. Thus the international community comes up
with a new fix but not every one is fooled by the silver bullets of MDGs
and governance. For example, when the 2002 Human Development Reports
concluded that good governance and strong institutions were necessary to
foster economic growth, the august Economist took the conclusion to task
reminding its readers that "governance and democracy, even together, are
not enough". (2) As it the 16th century wars of conquest, the sword had to
accompany the quest to "reduce" the Indian savages who were to be deprived
of their lands and families in the process.
In reality, the upsurge in the concern over governance responds to
the need to provide answers to the inevitable question of what to
do in the light of the failure of structural adjustments and "economic
reforms" to deliver political stability. In another sense, though,
neoliberalism is reaping rewards, at this new stage, from the
restructuring of political and economic power that took place over the
course of the previous decade. Having augmented economic inequality and
simultaneously increased the bargaining power of a governmental and
bureaucratic elite (while severely undermining social organizations) the
multilateral institutions are now prepared to negotiate with a severely
weakened state.
INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS
Notions of good governance measure effectiveness in terms of
market-friendly reforms and private-sector development yet take
countries in the opposite direction. Are markets subservient to
democratic institutions or, as the 2002 World Bank's World
Development Report's title suggests, is it all about Building
Institutions for Markets? (3) The 1997 World Development Report,
The State in a Changing World, acknowledges that the state has a
critical role to play in promoting development, in direct contrast to its
pro-market policies of the 1980s. The report envisages the state 'not as
a direct provider of growth but as a partner, catalyst, and
facilitator.'(4) But the good governance recipes handed down by the
economic powers and demanded by multinational corporations carefully avoid
raising questions about the nature and realm of development, the politics
of the dominant economic growth paradigm, and the forces that control such
development in their own self-interest.
The same corporate-generated neoliberal development model is
responsible for the enormous concentration of wealth and assets.
The Human Development Report admitted that over the course of
the 1990s, income per head fell in no fewer than 54 developing
countries, the very same years of "economic reform". (5) Perhaps
one had something to do with another? By no means said the
Bretton Woods institutions: the problem was not the reforms but
rather "institutional factors". For example, from precarious yet
stable balance between markets and states in Northern Europe
gave way to the "atomization of the State while elevating the
virtues of markets".
For the World Bank 'good governance' takes the form of forging a
capital-friendly agenda by way of constructing a supporting
positive relationship between the state, the market, and civil
society in loan-receiving countries. The 'minimalist state' is to give way
to an 'effective state' in order to achieve the unchanging primary goal.
An effective state, for the World Bank, is one that manages and regulates
the market in a non-confrontational and supportive way with refurbished
institutions. As for poverty and other social problems, these will be
alleviated as a result of the new relationships, legal reforms and
anti-corruption measures attractive to big capital.
More specifically, good governance for the Bank takes the form of
securing the establishment of a "well-functioning" market economy
with stable property rights, enforceable contracts, high levels of
transparency, and low levels of corruption. The creation of
effective institutions is seen as a counterweight to arbitrary or
"populist" state action, in which the international financial
institutions (IFIs) would feel supported within the country by way of an
expanded democratization and participation agenda- principally in
addressing the role of corruption. Addressing corruption however does not
take place as part of a democratization agenda but rather as a function of
insuring the macroeconomic "stability"(financial sector strengthening,
privatization, etc). Sooner than others, the World Bank has come to see
the relationship between state and the market at the core of a "good
governance" agenda, and therefore as a means to advancing toward the
materialization of the MDGs. But in any case the governance agenda
remains market-centric rather than state-centric. As one study concludes,
"the Bank's faith in market mechanisms underestimates the significant
challenges posed by institution-building and the need to protect the
vulnerable."(6)
How are those institutional factors to be addressed? Here is
where the school of market-oriented orthodoxy known as the
Washington Consensus introduced the notion of "good
governance" as a revised component of the neoliberal paradigm
stressing deeper political interventions to accompany the existing
economic ones. New recipes called for improved management
techniques and securing the collaboration of all the various social
actors (civil society and business). In this way, markets could
flourish as all "stakeholders" pitched-in to create the
"atmosphere" conducive to private foreign and national
investment. Notions of good governance measure effectiveness
in terms of market-friendly reforms and private-sector
development, yet the same thinking can take countries in the
opposite direction. Are markets therefore subservient to
democratic institutions or, as the 2002 World Bank's World
Development Report's title suggests, is it all about Building
Institutions for Markets? (7)
While some would have us believe that corruption and sloppy
governance are chiefly third world affairs, there are always cases
in the news that show the opposite. The most recently publicized
cases involve the arrest of Mark Thatcher for involvement in an
alleged coup plot in oil-rich Equatorial Guinea, or the scandal
plaguing the Riggs Bank in Washington DC which funneled
channels not only for ex-dictator Pinochet but also the family of
Obiang Nugema, president of Equatorial Guinea. Or the World
Bank involvement in the Lesotho Highlands Water project? (8)
Good governance recipes handed down by the economic powers
and demanded by multinational corporations carefully avoid
raising questions about the nature and realm of development, the
politics of the dominant economic growth paradigm, and the
forces that control such development in their own self-interest. The same
corporate-generated neoliberal development model is responsible for the
enormous concentration of wealth and assets in the hands of a few
transnational entities while causing massive social and environmental
dislocations. While the adoption or impositions of the models are overtly
political acts, there is a refusal to recognize their outcomes in
political terms. We witness therefore an attempt to depoliticize
development and governance, reframing these as largely technical problems
with technical solutions, denying the structural and political roots of
conflicts. Separating the notion of governance from democracy and
sovereignty is not simply inaccurate, it is dangerous. For example in
Chad, the international liberal community approves the World Bank's
imposing rules on the development of oil fields in that country, including
a plan in which revenues are held in escrow abroad and will be directly
spent on health, education and road programs. A revenue oversight
committee of citizens is monitoring the process.
Whatever the intentions, such a practice smacks of a return to
colonial management practices. (9) This is particularly true as
"good governance" has spelled more conditions being placed on
countries of the South in order to access or restructure loans. As
one study admits, "conditionality, or the attaching of conditions to
loans, has played a key role in the implementation of the good governance
agenda. The objective of governance conditionality is to exert pressure on
borrowing countries to improve their policies and thus enhance the
effectiveness of aid. During the course of the 1980s the number of good
governance conditions attached to World Bank loans rose dramatically, from
an average of 21 conditions per loan in 1980, to 55 by 1990, falling
gradually to 33 average conditions per loan by 2000. This ineffectiveness
derives in part from the vagueness of the concept of good governance
itself, and from the fact that there is a real confusion at the heart of
the governance agenda about whether governance is a precondition for
successful development or development's objective. (10)
REINFORCING THE DEVELOPMENT MODEL
Development theory aside, "good governance", in this context, is
reinforcing the hegemonic development paradigm and discourse
that precludes challenges to neoliberal orthodoxy as regards the
link between economic growth and democracy. Discussions over
governance tend to take place within its own framework carefully
excluding challenges to the economic model. The World Bank
cranks out policy guidelines (and conditionalities) on governance,
as it does on environment, conflict, poverty reduction, gender and
sustainable development insuring ample research, diffusion and
training in support of the policies. These carefully crafted
guidelines also serve the purpose of allowing the World Bank to
present itself as an entity (and a paradigm) responsive to the
pressures of social movements around the world.
The question is whether the type of governance developed by the
international financial institutions and the "donors" for their lending
and development policies limit themselves to procedural definitions of
democracy, with its corresponding emphasis on the importance of political
institutions for economic stability and growth, indirectly imposing
neoliberal economic policies as part of liberal political values that are,
in turn, the norms that should be followed by government. Under such an
approach the focus is placed on combating corruption and ensuring
accountability-in practice there is a further transfer of power towards
the top socially and bureaucratically, as both the public and standing
governmental structures become disempowered. Such a notion runs counter
to the positive examples being set in cities in the South where
progressive powers are building power and achieving municipal successes.
It is politics--and not pro-market management as the World Bank would have
it-that is at the center of local participatory governance debate and
practice, forging innovative styles of democracy and socio-economic
advances.
What is missing is a capacity to reflect and respect realities as
experienced by people outside of the narrow lens of capitalist
development and a hegemonic system based on greed,
economic imposition and militarism.
In its version of good governance, the International Monetary Fund
employs its power -that is, conditionality-to push "institution-
building" and policy "advice" on banking law, contract law,
company law, and on the role of the judiciary and arbitration
mechanisms modeled on US jurisprudence. The reforms get
"institutionalized" or locked-in through national laws and the threat of
sanctions. Departure from the governance norms can deprive the offending
government of the IMF seal of approval, which for "donors" is a
precondition to further lending. In similar fashion, according to one
study, "the World Bank's understanding of good governance continues to
reflect a concern over the effectiveness of the state rather than the
equity of the economic system and the legitimacy of the power
structure."(11) To which another analysis adds, "Much of the content of
the good governance agenda...is concerned with a very narrow set of issues
and interests: state accountability for business, less so for citizens
strengthening of property rights, but not land redistribution or attention
to criminal justice. It is not surprising, then, that many critics ask,
'where are the poor?' in the Bank's governance agenda". (12) Stated
differently, the rights of capital are locked in thereby locking out
democratic control over key aspects of the political economy. As
political scientist Stephen Gill argues, "in the new constitutional
frameworks of disciplinary neoliberalism the goal of public policy is
increasingly premised on the goal of increasing the security of property
(owners) and minimizing the uncertainty of investors partly through
placing populations and governments under constant surveillance". (13)
Of late, the "donors" are insisting that African governments take up their
own regional police work. The New Partnership for Africa's Development
(NEPAD) document presented by key African governments to the G8 and
embodied in the new African Unity platform places great emphasis on the
good governance agenda. But some Africans posed the uncomfortable
question whether this was really an "African" agenda or simply a sop to
the North in return for more assistance, debt relief and reduction in
trade barriers. According to one analysis, "despite NEPAD's emphasis on
democracy, the rule of law, peer review and other such political
instruments, NEPAD will fail because it is economically and fundamentally
flawed. The NEPAD economic prescriptions for Africa's development are
precisely the source of Africa's problems, in fact it can only worsen the
problems of Africa". (14)
While there is much to be commended in the "Peer Review"
mechanism announced by the steering committee of NEPAD
some weeks ago, particularly its review of country records on
human rights and democratic practice, other elements such as
economic transparency and property-protecting mechanisms
(economic management) responds to the corporate agenda. Will
this bring the 34 African countries that are LDCs any closer to the
MDGs? Indeed, it just may be that the achieving both the set of
economic and social goals proves impossible. Exports are
growing, as are net resource flows, but the IFIs seem reluctant to
channel new resourced into social policies. Small wonder that that
NEPAD is heading in both directions at once--UNCTAD cautions
that the number of people in the LDCs living on one dollar or less a day
may increase from 335 million in 2000 to 471 million by 2015. (15)
DEMOCRACY AND PEOPLE'S GOVERNANCE
Ugandan political economist Yash Tandon suggests there is a
"mainstream" theory seeking "to hide the systemic causes of
poverty and conflict in Africa." (16) According to Tandon, the
dominant discourse on the causes of conflict in Africa will
emphasize the lack of economic growth and poor governance.
"Of course," says Tandon, "these aspects of good governance
are important not because the West now includes these as part of
the 'conditionalities' for aid to Africa but because Africans also
value life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, just like anybody
else."
While the adoption of official good governance models is overtly
political acts, there is a refusal to recognize their outcomes in
political terms. Stated in other words, we witness an attempt to
depoliticize development and governance, reframing these as
largely technical problems with technical solutions, denying the
structural and political roots of conflicts. Separating the notion of
governance from democracy is not simply inaccurate, it is dangerous.
Better public administration and technological know-how are not,
in and of themselves, sufficient to impel fundamental changes in
governmental policies, let alone its social impact. Empowerment
of peoples may be listed as a goal, but in contradictory fashion,
so too is the need and demand for external political vigilance,
conditionality or "policy leverage" as expressed by the World
Bank and the "donor community". The degrees of external
influence and even control will vary from one poor country to
another, but this involvement forms part of the dynamics of "local"
politics including oppression, and such dynamics many times
entailing long term "instability" and new conflict. By the same
token, if poverty as defined by Amartya Sen is "capability
deprivation" (17), one must seek the deprivers and system of
generating deprivation also in global historical terms, including the
identification of international (mal) governance. As with the global
political regimes, the global trade and finance regimes are highly unequal
and non-transparent, and are disproportionately weighted on the side of
rich countries. Yet most approaches to governance and the MDGs
conveniently cast aside that central reality. Governments and governance
seems closed to the option of exploring other development and political
models that structurally prioritize the elimination of poverty and hunger
along with redistribution policies to counter deepening inequality and
political apathy.
Many components of the official good governance agenda have
been long present in past and ongoing struggles for
democratization (participation, accountability and transparency).
But in the modern world the struggle for democratic governance
cannot and does not stop at the local or national level. The search
for people's governance entails tackling the unjust distribution of
power and insuring basic services to the population. It entails, in most
cases, resisting the privatization of water and electricity services, or
agricultural liberalization, which are taken by "donors" and governments
as fundamentals of "good governance". Unless "good governance" and the
MDGs can clearly address the core causes that create and entrench
instability, poverty and hunger, they are irrelevant.
One would conclude that the governance promoted by the
multilateral agencies is at odds with other policies they also claim to
support. Good governance (as interpreted by the IFIs) and the MDGs share
the same assumption that rapid economic growth will effectively address
their respective aspirations. Diverse studies however have pointed to the
limitations of the "growth response" indicating that the emphasis on quick
growth has come at the expense of equity and equality, and therefore at
the expense of democratic governance. (18) Unless one applies narrow
managerial and numerical criteria to determine what is poverty or what is
appropriate governance, then the result is not satisfactory from a social
standpoint. At the same time, good governance recipes strongly discourage
direct intervention by governments to regulate to mitigate and prevent
negative social impacts. Thus there is a basic contradiction between
poverty eradication on the one hand, and the narrow application of good
governance development strategies on the other. Those contradictions must
be acknowledged and unpacked in order to arrive at a genuine discussion
about possible alternatives.
There is consequently a need to shift or broaden the governance
discussion to include the nature and operating condition of
multilateral institutions and corporate capital. Few things could be as
dangerous as believing that the profit-oriented nature of private capital,
and the corporations to which it belongs, can meet the growing demands of
the poor for better services at affordable prices. Unfortunately the trend
among development "experts" in the North (with their many official
followers in the South) is that a profit-driven strategy can indeed
"empower" the poor and even lower the higher prices they are forced to
pay. (19) How easy to prefer this harmonious interpretation over the sad
reality of rebellions and groundless hope that is part of the reality of
the oppressed.
POLITICS, NOT GOVERNANCE, IS THE KEY
In a recent study by the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam, there is an
examination of Latin America and of the episode that lay basis to the
claim that the "left is back" (as though it had absent itself). Diverse
studies explore examples of progressive parties in local office from
across the continent (Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador) where
successes and failures are being monitored. The study shows that in every
experience, politics rather than management (governance) is at the center
of the local governance debates. (20)
In the final analysis, the fundamental problem is not governance or
the MDGs, but rather our inability to use these two areas to
question the justification and dominance of the neoliberal
paradigm. Are we talking about ideological instruments intended
to shore up neoliberalism's dwindling legitimacy, or are we
referring to valid instrumental concepts and goals oriented to
improve the efficiency, the planning of governmental institutions
and the political system? Whatever the inclination, it is important to
scrutinize technical approaches that tend to hide and fragment reality. A
holistic interpretation is required in order to arrive at the objective
limitations of the MDGs and the notion of good governance: to have the
analytical courage and intellectual integrity to ponder what are the
political and institutional pre- conditions that limit development. We
need to remind ourselves that both the MDGs and governance are born not
simply as occurrences of a given moment, but in response to concrete
political problems. . Today, the moment is changing and we must be aware
that the "war on terror" is taken precedence over the war on poverty and
hunger, providing a useful excuse for governmental failure, North and
South, to assign resources for the eradication of poverty and hunger.
Terrorism, poverty, hunger and mal-governance are not "current
conditions". They are all the products of historical processes of
marginalization, mal-development, expropriation, exploitation and
desperation. Addressing these issues requires addressing the
social, cultural, political and economic forces and processes that
perpetuate vulnerability, marginalization and corruption
Good governance as with good intentions on the MDGs must
confront and not disguise those structures and systems that
generate enormous inequalities between in global consumption
and are responsible for the state of oppression and misery
afflicting the majority of the world's inhabitants. This system of
neoliberal global and national governance designed to enrich a
few and make them ever more powerful, allowing them to practice
war at will, cannot at the same eradicate poverty, save the
environment and prevent new wars.
It is also realistic to recognize that the Millennium Development
Goals--like, An Agenda for Peace, An Agenda for Development
and perhaps Good Governance itself--, which collectively
captured the aspirations of the post-Cold War "international
community", no longer remain at the nucleus of United Nations
system or chief concerns of the rich countries. It was hoped that,
collectively, these initiatives would lead to a better understanding of
the persistent systemic, political, institutional and operational
obstacles that confront post-conflict peacebuilding and suggest ways of
overcoming them. Attention and policies are increasingly driven, in the
United Nations and elsewhere, by the new US dominated militarist landscape
of the post 9/11 environment. Under such circumstances, the once positive
normative potentials risk becoming nothing or, worse yet, becoming an
instrument for waging counterinsurgency.
In short be need a better recognition, understanding and critical
appraisal of the nature of the political, institutional and global
obstacles that confront the MDGs, avoiding blaming the victims
(for example, the now proverbial explanations of bad governance
and corruption) and focusing more on the security and global
impediments. Only a comprehensive understanding can suggest
ways of overcoming them.
* Alejandro Bendana is a member of the International South Group
Network and director of the Centro de Estudios Internacionales
Managua, Nicaragua. He is also on the board of Focus on the
Global South.
NOTES
1. See M. Mallock Brown's introduction to the 2002 Human
Development Report, Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented
World,
2. "Years of Plenty?" The Economist, July 12th, 2003, p. 68.
3. World Development Report 2002, Building Institutions for
Markets, (Washington, 2002).
4. World Development Report 1997,The State in a Changing
World, p.1.
5. Neoliberal policies have vastly increased the numbers of the
poor and "extremely poor," and widened the gulf separating rich
and poor. According to a recent report from ECLA: Poverty is the
greatest challenge for the economies of Latin America and the
Caribbean. Between 1980 and 1990 it worsened as a result of the
crisis and the adjustment policies, wiping out most of the progress
in poverty reduction achieved during the 1960's and 1970's.
Recent estimates place the number of poor at the beginning of this
decade, depending on the definition of poverty, somewhere
between 130 and 196 million. Recession and adjustment in the
eighties also increased income inequality in most of the region. In
the countries with the most highly concentrated income distribution, the
richest 10 percent of the households receive 40 percent of the total
income. Cited in Atilio Bor?n, "Democracy or Neoliberalism", Boston
Review.
6. Vivian Collingwood, ed., "Good Governance and the World Bank",
www.brettonwoodsproject.org
7. World Development Report, Building
Institutions for Markets, (Washington, 2002).
8. Rod Little, "Help me,
Wonga", The Spectator (UK), September 3, 2004; Mike Muller, Getting
Priorities Right, Business Day (South Africa), September 3, 2004.
www.odiousdebts.org
9. The New York Times, (Editorial) August 1, 2004.
10. Vivian Collingwood, ed., "Good Governance and the World Bank",
www.brettonwoodsproject.org
11. Santiso, C., 'Governance Conditionality
and the Reform of Multilateral Development Finance', G8 Governance no.7,
at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/governance/santiso2002-gov7.pdf.
12. Bretton Woods Project, Good Governance and the World Bank,
www.brettonwoodsproject.org. p.26.
13. Stephen Gill, "American Transparency Capitalism and Human Security: A
Contradiction in Terms", Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 15, No. 1,
(February 2003), p.40
14. Until the last diamond-Civil Wars in Africa", Supplement,
Alternatives, Alternative Information & Development Centre, Vol. 2, No. 5,
(April, 2003). p. 2
15. "Strong growth amid poverty", Africa Renewal, UN
Department of Public Information, Vol. 18, no. 2, (July 2004), p.24
16. Yash Tandon, "Root Causes of Peacelessness and Approaches to Peace in
Africa", Peace & Change, Volume 25, No. 2, (April, 2000), pp. 166-187.
17. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (Oxford, 1999), p. 13
18. "Contradictions between the stated goals of eradicating extreme poverty
and hunger, and the development policies promoted by donors, IFIs and the
UN. The policies and economic strategies promoted by the IFIs, regional
banks, and bilateral donors/creditors often contradict important UN
conventions on development and human rights, and undermine the UN's
commitment to the MDGs. Focus on the Global South, "Anti- Poverty or
Anti-Poor: The Millennium Development Goals and the eradication of extreme
poverty and hunger", (Bangkok, 2003) p.13, http://focusweb.org/pdf/MDG-2003.pdf
19. Development students are now told to support profit-driven strategies: "If we stop
thinking of the poor as victims or as a burden and start recognizing them as resilient
entrepreneurs and value-conscious consumers, a whole new world of
opportunity will open up", C.H. Prahalad, "Face Value, Profits and
Poverty", The Economist, August 21st, 2005.
20. "The Left in the City", Transnational Institute Politics, (Amsterdam) www.tni.org
FOCUS ON TRADE
NUMBER 105, OCTOBER 2004
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