The optimism of the supporters of the so-called Half Moon, in Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija and Cochabamba, is abating following the decision taken by the prefects (elected departmental authorities) of these departments, who want to feint the Revocation Referendum by bringing forward the elections and through other political actions aimed at derouting the legal and constitutional track President Evo Morales is following.

The euphoria these sectors showed in the referenda of May 4 in Santa Cruz, June 1 in Beni and Pando and June 22 in Tarija contrasts with the more discrete tone of the voices that appear in the media now, declaring that the Revocation Referendum will not manage to resolve the political crisis and might rather be a waste of time and resources for the country.

The latest play to the gallery of the autonomists’ elitist fervor came from the prefect of Tarija, Mario Cossio, on the night of June 22: “We owe today’s victory solely to the people, the fundamental protagonist of this victory that we have to show our admiration for. It is clear that we value it, too, just like the precedent ones, as a victory for Bolivia.”

Hours after the polls of Tarija the prefects of the Half Moon had to define their positions regarding the revocation referendum, given that three weeks ago, the National Electoral Tribunal put into motion all its administrative and logistic apparatus in order to reach the date of the Revocation Referendum–August 10–in good conditions.

Time is working against the prefects and they are reacting late, because the idea of the revocation referendum has already established itself in popular sectors which perceive this step as the government’s best weapon to relegitimate itself and to dampen the prefects’ pride.

Exaggerated triumphalism

Based on the lobby of the “million” that took place on December 15, 2007, the conservative sectors of Santa Cruz believed it was possible to convert social legitimacy into political legality. They felt very sure that social pressure could do more than the legal framework of the rule of law that supports the government.

Up to a certain point, the Autonomy Referenda had the function of a card in the negotiations to open a dialogue in which the government would make big concessions as to the New Constitution and the redistribution of the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons. On Evo’s order, vice president Alvaro Garcia Linera made remarkable efforts to bring about this bargaining table, and with more than a few concessions as a basis of possible agreements.

Time and time again, these meetings were useless and the opponent prefects disregarded any invitation to this table. This pedantic attitude has been conducted by a shady scheme, that avoided splits between the opponent prefects and led, in the midst of this arrogance, to an even more ambitious attitude: This attitude indicated that any agreement with Evo would be very partial and short term and that therefore it was better to take the risk of putting the “indio” (Evo) in checkmate once and for all. Key counter chessmen of these negotiations were the prefects of Santa Cruz, Ruben Costas, and the civil leader Branco Marinkovic, who knew about the dimension of the internal and external financial and logistic support promised to this plan.

From outside of the country, the checkmate was encouraged, because the hard sectors of the United States and Europe had formed a catastrophic vision of the political situation in Bolivia. They had or still have a feeling that Evo’s fall is just a matter of one last push, which is far from true. The news agencies – intending to further the cause of the Creole right – contributed to this false perception.

Now, the opponent prefects reject the revocation referendum and call for general elections instead. By doing this they again take the risk of relying on their influence via the media due to their financial power. They want to restore the general perception that the country is on the edge of collapse and that the only way out is to bring forward the general elections.

They talk about a terminal crisis, when in Bolivia nobody is dying or getting hurt, and the situation can by no means be described as critical.

Definitely, there are a lot of indications that the advisers of the Half Moon made the wrong political calculations. These advisers assumed that through a holy alliance between economic and media power, they were possessing the prerequisites to create political power and by these means, erode the basis of the government’s legitimacy. Several channels lent their support explicitly to this mission, such as Unitel, Red Uno and PAT, which belong to businessmen from the Santa Cruz region, closely connected to the ambitions of the Half Moon.

The plan did not work out, because apart from what the national and external media reflect, Evo knows the real degree of support he has generated in the last two and a half year of governing, above all in the rural areas, but also in the cities. He himself is indigenous and he is familiar with the idiosyncrasy of the farmers, which expresses itself in a patient attitude at the beginning, but which can culminate in an uncontrollable revolt. That is why he recently expressed his fear of an “insurrection of the people”.

On the military and police front, the government has also created certain conditions. The ethics and convictions reflected by the president have achieved a significant support by those in charge in the Armed Forces, who insist on reconciliation with the people and who, for this reason, consistently say no to the plots of the opposition.

Inside his government team, Evo has managed to generate a high morale that instills optimism in the group and which instead of worrying seeks to carry out governance. It is due to this that the president can be found every day in the most remote corners of Bolivia in large gatherings of farmers, delivering economic support in the framework of his program “Evo cumple” (Evo keeps his promise).

At the most critical moments of the conflict, some of his ministers even urged him to take a more reconciliatory position. He proved his ability to be flexible and kept on seeking dialogue. This went on until he discovered that plan A of the Half Moon was to overthrow him and that plans B and C had already been abandoned. The extreme autonomist right was trying to act just like the childish extreme left of the past. It decided to make or break. It did not accept the concessions the government offered at the end of 2007, and it believed it had the strength and the ideas to win the battle.

Some intellectuals do notice, even though they do not express it overtly: This president has the solid morale that is characteristic of great leaders. That kind of morale that does not give in, not even when the ship is in danger of sinking. This kind of morale generates a degree of mobilization and creative support in a large part of the governmental structure that does its best not to disappoint the population.

Now the opponent prefects have their back up against the wall, and in their heart of hearts they admit that whole autonomy referenda show was of little use. Disrespect for the Constitution, the waste of millions of prefectural funds raised from hydrocarbons, insubordination to the government and a lack of respect for the president unprecedented in the history of Bolivian democracy.

Now the social movements and the citizens take back the political initiative and accuse the prefects of being cowards. They state that the opponent prefects want to sneak out of the bullring of August 10, because they know they are going to lose.

If Evo comes out of this battle with flying colors, it will be shown that the combination of good political action (program) with good leadership (Evo), added to an intense mobilization of the whole government team (MAS and social movements), can be very useful to communicate and administer proposals for change, even in the framework of the old model of representative democracy.

“If they (the prefects) are defeated, it will be a precedent for some politicians to never again raise their hands against the people”, one citizen declared to a broadcast on Radio Fides, recently, referring to the seditious nature of the autonomy referenda in the eastern departments of the country.

The battle still goes on, but the degrees of support for the prefects and the president become clearer. The prefects throw their weight about on television screens, but reality has been somewhat more complex and adverse to them.  (Translation: ALAI).

-Grover Cardozo is a Bolivian Journalist.